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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
JESS W. PICKETT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES, ) 
a California corporation, and ) 
THE COUNTY OF IRON, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Utah,) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
Case No. 16627 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to estop the COUNTY 
OF IRON, a political subdivision of the State of Utah from 
expanding or modifying a public thoroughfare acquired by a 
prescriptive right to allow a private person or legal entity 
by franchise to use property of the Plaintiff's for personal 
profit and requesting that the Defendant, CALIFOINIA·PACIFIC 
remove their pole line property from that land n0w i:nffied by 
the Plaintiff in fee. 
This is an appeal from an action brought before the Fifth 
Judicial District Court for Iron County, State of Utah. The 
Plaintiff, alleged that the Defendant UTILITY COMPANY, did 
trespass upon his property and continues such trespass after 
having erected power poles and stringing transmission lines. Said 
1 
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power poles and transmission lines interfere with Plaintiff's~ 
right to full enjoyment and use of his fee. Specifically, 
the structures present a dangerous hazard of electrocution 
to the Plaintiff as he conducts his agricultural irrigation 
operat,ion through the use of sprinkler pipes. The poles and 
lines being so close as to present an obstruction when the 
sprinkler pipes are moved from located to location within the, 
Plaintiff's fields. 
Furthermore, Defendant UTILITY COMPANY erected the power 
poles and transmission lines along a right-of-way over the 
Plaintiff's fee which was acquired through adverse prescripti~ 
Under operation of the laws of the State of Utah, such an 
easement or right-of-way becomes a public thoroughfare for 
transportation of people and livestock. By Defendant's action 
I 
they imposed an additional use upon the easement thus creatinii 
an additional servitude upon the servient estate whose title 
is now held by the Plaintiff. Such additional burden constitutl 
a taking of the Plaintiff's property which was without just 
compensation to the Plaintiff, thereby depriving him of due 
~rocess of law as guaranteed by the constitution of the 
United States of America and the constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
The questions therefore before this Court are as follows: 
Should an abutting land owner incur an additional burden 
upon his fee from an additional use of a public right-of-way 
by a company for its own commercial purposes without compensal 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Does an abutting land owner have no course of relief 
for damage as a result of a power company erecting power 
poles and transmission lines upon a public right-of-way or 
easement in which the abutting landowner has the fee? 
May a power company enter into a highway and occupy 
and portion thereof, without consent of the landowner, when 
such entry is not ~or a purpose incidental to the use of the 
highway by the public for travel? 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. Judgment was granted to 
Defendants. The Court ruling that the placement of a powec line 
enchances the public use of a prescriptive easement, was a 
benefit to the public, and was included within the public 
easement for travel obtained by prescription. Judgment was 
granted with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the 
Judgment of the Trial Court and ordering Defendants, 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC to remove their pole line property from the 
property of the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiff be awarded 
damages for the period of time that the Defendant, CALIFORNIA 
PACIFIC has trespassed upon the property of the Plaintiffs and 
until same is removed from the Plaintiff's property; and cost 
of this action incurred by the Plaintiff as determined by 
this Court; and that the COUNTY OF IRON be estopped from 
3 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
further expansion or modification of public thoroughfares 
acquired by prescriptive right without authorization of the 
legal abutting owner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is the owner of the Northeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter, Section 7, Township 34 South, Range 9 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and said fact was stipulated~ 
I 
by the parties hereto, (T 6, 10-15). On or about January 26, 
1976, the Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC did place their power , 
pole line on and over the property of the Plaintiffs for 
personal profit (T 28, 14-17). 
The COUNTY OF IRON previously acquired a prescriptive ~.· 
right-of-way for public use in the nature of vehicular traffic i 
and that of driving livestock over said property has been 
used by the general public and was stipulated to and shown in ' 
~ 
the record (T 8, 4-13). 
Prior to the installation of the pole line by the Defendanj 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, the Plaintiff did notify said Defendant ~ 
on January 22, 1976 that the Plaintiff was the fee owner of ' 
said property and that an easement authorized by the Plaintiffl 
would be required to construct the power line on said property 
(T 28 17-22), and the Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC did in 
fact place their pole line on said property on or about Janualii 
26, 1976 without authorization by the Plaintiff, (T 28, 14-17). 
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The Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC built said line to 
replace a line that existed on neighboring property for a 
benefit to the neighboring property (T 13, 16-28), and said 
line could have crossed the roadway at the end of the existing 
line (T 14, 18-26) and does in fact cross the roadway at the 
west end of the pole line in question and said line could 
have been built on the south side of said right-of-way (Map, 
T 15, 10-19). 
Said line as placed over said property in question does 
create a hazard to the Plaintiff (T 36, 9-22), and said power 
line could have crossed the right-of-way at the serviae pole 
of the Plaintiffs and could have been installed on the eoeth 
side of the roadway on the neighboring property for ~-e 
benefit the old original line was removed (T 37, 1-5). 
The service pole installed for the benefit of the Plaiatiff 
(T 35, 11-20) does have cross arms that extend over thie fence 
and over the property of the Plaintiff, and the newly 
constructed line extending west to the first pole of the mew 
construction does cross over the fence of the Plaintiff 
thereby encroaching on to the property of the Plaintiff (T 35, 
5-15, T 42, 30, T 43, 1). 
POIN.1._L 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COUNTY COULD AUTHORIZE 
PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF POLES AND POWER LINES 
OVER A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR PUBLIC TRAVEL, 
THEREBY EXPANDING AND MODIFYING SAME BEYOND 
U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended). 
5 
, 
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The brief of the Defendant the COUNTY OF IRON to the 
Trial Court in relying on U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended) 
authorizing a permanent installation, failed to cite any 
precedent as to a prescriptive right-of-way within this State 
or any sister state. To date, the only reference on a 
similar matter was White v. Salt Lake City, 121 U. 134, 239 
P. 2d 210, and this matter pertained to a dedicated right-of-way 
by reason of a platted map being filed as a subdivision, and 
this Court ruled that the fee rested with the County when said 
property was dedicated. Counsel for the COUNTY OF IRON states 
that such an act is authorized by IMPLICATION, but without 
authority or precedent this can only be an assumption on the 
part of counsel. 
The Plaintiff in his original brief to the Trial Court 
did refer to White v. Salt Lake City and the fact that this 
Court dealt with the question of dedication of the entire fee.· 
The Plaintiff also cited other precedent that concerned itself 
with similar circumstances to this action of a prescriptive 
right-of-way from other states with the rulings vesting 
the fee to the abutting owner subject only to the right-of-way 
for public thoroughfare. It was found by the Courts that 
conduits of public utilities or foreign municipalities which di 
not serve the abutting property constitute an additional servit 
is borne out by the following authorities: Sterling's Appe~. 
1886, 111 PA. 35, 2A. 105; Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural~ 
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Co., 1890 124 Ind. 577, 24NE. 1066, 8 L.R.A. 602; Ward v. 
Triple State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 1903, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 116, 
74 S.W. 709; Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 1891, 128 N.Y. 50, 
27 N.E. 973; and Hofius v. Carneghie-Illinois Steel Corp. 
1946, 146 Ohio St. 574, 67 N.E. 2nd 429. The rule announced 
in these cases is that abutting property owners have a right 
in the roadway paramount to all uses except public travel, and 
additional servitudes cannot be imposed without payment of 
compensation, Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., supra. 
The ruling in Cathey v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 1'36 
193 Ark. 92, 97 S.W. 2nd 624 stated that: 
"A land owner is entitled to compensation for 
additional servitudes that may be placed upon 
the servient estate. Such would be the case 
if the highway is used for the erection of 
poles and the stringing of wires for the 
tramsmission of electricity where the original 
burden was merely for highway purpose." 
In trial, the Court determined that a right~of-way over 
the property was created over 50 years ago. Title to the land 
and right-of-way passed through owners until coming to res.t 
in the hand of Plaintiff. While title to the servient estate 
remains in the Plaintiff, the public has a right-of-way for 
travel over the easement. The Trial Court erroneously ruled 
that Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC also had perfected a right to 
use the road for commercial transmission of their energy, 
without affording any compensation to the Plaintiff. 
The Trial Court determined the utility could, with 
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impunity, erect power poles and string transmission lines. 
Perhaps the court did so as it considered the use of the 
easement by the UTILITY COMPANY to be incidental to the 
established use of the highway by the public for travel. 
Alternatively, the Trial Court considered that the COUNTY 
OF IRON could confer such a right upon the Defendant, 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, to establish such an obstruction under 
the language of U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended). In either 
case, the Trial Court erred. 
At one time the courts would consider the distinction be[l 
uses indigenous to urban roads and uses indigenous to rural r~ 
Montgomery v. Santa Ana Electric Railroad Co., 104 Cal 186, 
37 P 786; Dooly Block v. Salt Lake R.T. Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 
P 229. Now the trend is away from making such a distinction 
between types of roads. Rather, as in Palmer v. Larchmont 
Electrical Co. , 52 N. E. 1093; ancillary fixtures such as water 
mains, gas pipelines, electrical transmission lines, or light 
poles have a relationship to the highway in either one of two 
manners, (1) those uses directly related to use of the 
thoroughfare by the public; and (2) those uses not directly 
related to public use of and travel upon the thoroughfare. 
In the matter at hand, the original use of the easement or 
right-of-way, was for public travel by people and livestock 
only. (T 8, 4-13). 
8 
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Extending the logic of such an objective or a highway 
purpose, sewers or culverts drain surface water from the 
road, thus relieving the highway from impairments. Therefore, 
sewers or culverts are for valid highway purposes. Water 
mains may be used to supply water to clean and sprinkle streets. 
Light poles may aid in night travel upon highways. Such 
burdens upon an easement are both used for highway purposes and 
municipal purposes, which are incident to the highway purposes. 
Not so with telegraph, telephone or power wires and poles. 
They are not related to preserve in travel upon the street, 
road or highway along which such wires are strung. 
Addressing such a dichotomy in manner of highway uses by 
utility companies is Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, 173 Ill 
29, 52 N.E. 973. The court there recognized in that the 
erection of poles and wires by an electric company, not for 
the purpose of lighting public ways and places, but for the 
purposes of supplying light to individual and firms in the 
transaction of its own corporate and commercial business, 
constituted an additional burden or servitude upon the servient 
tenement, for which the owner of the same may demand and 
receive compensation. 
Even in jurisdiction still recognizing the distinction 
between rural roads and urban roads, occupation of a rural 
highway, the fee of which belongs to the abutting owner and by 
the telegraph company for the erection of its poles and 
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transmission lines, is an additional burden to the easement 
for a highway, for which the owners of the fee are entitled 
to compensation. Eels v. American Telephone and Telegraph 
Co. 143 NY 133, 38 N.E. 202. 
In the final analysis, whether the use of the easement in 
question by the Utility Company is incidental to the use of tb; 
highway by the public for travel, some jurisdictions have held 
although the poles and wires are reasonably necessary and 
proper for lighting the right-of-way, their further use for 
the furnishing of electricity to private parties is unauthorizl 
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 160 Cal 699, 117 P 
906; French v. Robb, 67 NJL 260; 51 A 509. In the instant 
case, the power line is not used for lighting or any road-
related purpose. 
Relevant to the issue of a local municipality conferring 
the right of the Utility Company to enter onto the easement 
for the purposes of erecting poles and stringing lines is 
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., supra. In this 
instance the land was dedicated to the public for a highway 
while the owner retained his right to the soil for all purpose: 
not inconsistent with the public's easement. The only control 
which the County Board of Supervisors could exercise was such 
as was necessary to maintain the highway in a proper condition 
for use by the public. Hence, a municipality embracing the 
highway could not confer on a third person the right to enter; 
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on the highway and occupy any portion thereof, without the 
consent of the landowner, when such entry was not for a 
purpose incidental to the effective use of the highway by 
the public for travel. 
In conclusion, a fundamental principle which is basic 
to the use of all easements, is that the owner of the easement 
cannot increase the burden upon the servient estate or impose 
thereon a new burden. Duet v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 
169 F Supp 184; Wall v. Rudolph, 198 Cal App 684, 18 Cal Rptr 123, 
3 ALR 3d 1242; Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 
Utah 213; 17 5 P2d 148, ALR 17 5; Haines v. Golles, 76 WY 411, 
303 P2d 1004, Likewise, Davis v. Jefferson Co. Tel. Co.; 
82 WVA 357, 95 SE 1042; it has been widely held that erecting 
electric light poles and wires over and along a right-of-way 
constitutes a new and additional burden upon the abutting fee 
and is an obstruction in one way or another, Carpenter v. 
Capitol Electric, supra; Crullen v. Edison Electric Illumination 
Co., 254 Mass 93, 149 NE 665. 
It has been widely held that electric light and power lines 
in a public street or highway, so placed for the power company's 
connnercial and corporate purposes of furnishing electric current 
to private individuals or concerns, do constitute an additional 
servitude or easement for the owner of the abutting property. 
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., supra Carpenter v. 
Capitol Electric Co., supra; Potomac Edison Co. v. Routlahn, 
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192 Md 449, 65 A2D 580; Berry v. Southern Pine Electric 
Power Assn., 222 Miss 260, 76 So2D 212; Brown v. Asheville 
Electric Light Co., 138 NC 533, 51 SE 62. A number of courts. 
have held that power poles and transmission lines are an 
additional servitude even where the public has a qualified 
fee in the street for street purposes. Callen v. Columbus 
Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio St 166, 64 NE 141. 
In one instance, even where the power company acquired 
the right to string wires along the side of a highway through, 
eminent domain, it was held to be an additional burden on the 
servient estate. Such additional burden thereby interfered 
with the fee owner's raising of crops thereon, thus entitling\ 
the fee owner to damages. Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank. 
72 ND 497, 8 NW 2d 599. 
Again amplifing the right of the fee owner to receive 
damages is Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, supra, where it was 
held that the owner of the fee may demand damages when a power 
company erects poles and strings transmission lines for its 
own counnercial purposes. Likewise, where the landowner had 
previously granted to the electric company an easement for the 
purpose of constructing and maintaining power lines, the 
power company, subsequently authorized the local municipality 
to attach wires and appurtenances to the power company's poles 
In this instance the court held that the additional lines of 
the municipality, with a corresponding right to enter upon 
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lands for maintenance purposes, placed an additional burden 
on owner's land without his consent, thus entitling the 
owner to compensation. Therefore, any additional burden upon 
a grant of an easement entitles the landowner to just 
compensation. Grimes v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 
96 SE2d 713. 
In giving grounds for relief or damages, a few courts 
have held that should the easement exceed his rights either 
in the manner or in the extent of it's use, the easement owner 
becomes a trespasser to the extent of the unathorized use. 
Adams v. Winnett, 25 Tenn App 276, 156 DE2d 353. Raven Red 
Ash Coal v. Ball, 185 VA 534, 39 SE2d 231. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE 
INCLUDED THE ENTIRE FEE FOR PUBLIC USE AS 
STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.~ 
'' 
In the brief to the Trial Court by the Defendant, CALIFORNIA 
PACIFIC, the counsel makes a point that a highway is deemed to 
have been dedicated when it is used for a period of 10 years 
as per U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended). U.C.A. 27-12-89 
merely refers to a "thoroughfare for the public use" and not 
to a permanent installation for commercial gains or personal 
profit. The word "thoroughfare" was defined as a place or 
way through which there is passing or travel. It became a 
. 
"public thoroughfare" when the public acquired a general 
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right of passage. Morris v. Blunt, 49 U 243, 161 P. 1127. 
U.C.A. 27-12-101 (1953, as amended) reads as follows: 
"TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY STATE. Title to 
real property acquired by the state road conunission 
or the counties, cities and towns, either by gift, 
agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation or 
otherwise, for highway rights-of-way or other 
highway purposes, may be in fee simple or any lesser 
estate or interest. A transfer of land bounded 
by a public highway on a right-of-way for which 
the public has only an easement passes the 
title of the person whose estate is transferred to 
the middle of the highway." (Emphasis added) 
By reading both U.C.A. 27-12-101 and U.C.A. 27-12-89 
(1953, as amended) , it is clear that the intent of the State 
Legislature was that any implied dedication after a period 
of 10 years use by the public, is merely a dedication to the 
public of the right of thoroughfare or passage and cannot 
constitute a dedication of the entire fee interest in the I 
I 
property of the abutting owner over which the easement exists! 
If it is the premise by the Trial Court and Defendant, . 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, that the entire fee is to be dedicated af* 
a 10-year period, it could also be held that, in an area withu 
this State where there are many miles of roads similar to the 
road which is the subject of this action, over lands that are 
subject to oil and hydrocarbon deposits, by the dedication of 
the entire fee under U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended), any 
revenues derived from the production and sale of said minerali 
would belong to the public by reason of such dedication of thl 
fee of the thoroughfare for public use. Profits from mineral! 
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and those of a utility placing a power line for commercial 
gains are similar in that they are personal profit. It is 
hard to conceive that the State Legislature intended that 
more than the right to passage and thoroughfare was included 
in U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended), rather than the 
entire fee interest as presented by the Trial Court and the 
Defendant Utility Company, and the State Legislature did 
in fact spell out the title to fee of an abutting owner in 
U.C.A. 27-12-101 (1953, as amended). If the intent were that 
the entire fee were to pass, this would constitute the taking of 
a person's property without just compensation, thereby 
depriving a person of his or her due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States of 
America and the State of Utah. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR , 
WHEN IT RULED THAT POWER LINES OF THE 
DEFENDANT FOR PERSONAL PROFIT WAS FOR THE 
PUBLIC BENEFIT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 6, 
CONCLUSION OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
If the power line in question are for the purpose of 
aiding in travel for the public over this section of highway, 
it could be said that this installation was for the "Public 
Benefit". However, in trial by the lower court, it was 
determined that the installation of the power poles and 
lines was for the Defendant. CALIFORNIA PACIFIC's use 
for profit and in no way benefited the thoroughfare or highway. 
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The erection of poles and wires by an eletric company, not 
for the purpose of lighting public way and places, but for tt 
purposes of supplying light to individuals and firms in the 
transaction of its own corporate and commercial business, 
constitutes an additional easement or servitude on the 
highway, for which the owner of the fee may demand compensati~ 
Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of all the foregoing, and the equities which 
overwhelmingly preponderate in Plaintiff's favor: 
1. This Court should reverse the Judgment of the Trial I 
I 
Court and remand the case with instructions to order the I 
Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC to remove its pole line and 
wires from the property of the Plaintiff; 
2. The Trial Court should be instructed to award 
damages to the Plaintiff for the period of time that the 
Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC has trespassed upon the 
property of the Plaintiffs; 
3. This Court should order the Trial Court to enjoin 
and restrain the Defendant, COUNTY OF IRON from further 
authorizing the expansion or modification of public thorough· 
fares acquired by prescriptive right or by U.C.A. 27-12-89 
(1953, as amended), unless authorized by the abutting legal 
owner of the fee; or unless proper condemnation procedures 
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are employed. 
4. Instruct the Trial Court to Order the Defendants 
to pay all cost incurred by the Plaintiff in this action. 
DATED:~~-November 1979. 
Respectfully submitted. 
JESS W. PICKETT 
Attorney pro se 
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